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Abstract
Since there is, in principle, no reason why third parties should not
pay individuals for the use of their data, we introduce a realistic market
that would allow these payments to be made while taking into account
the privacy attitude of the participants. And since it is usually important
to use unbiased samples to obtain credible statistical results, we examine
the properties that such a market should have and suggest a mechanism
that compensates those individuals that participate according to their risk
attitudes. Equally important, we show that this mechanism also benefits
buyers, as they pay less for the data than they would if they compensated
all individuals with the same maximum fee that the most concerned ones
expect.
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1 Introduction
Not a single week goes by without a discussion in the media and the blogosphere
about data privacy in large companies and governments, a sign that the han-
dling of privacy is becoming a center of attention for the global society of the
web. To the usual clamor of abuses by data aggregators, marketing companies
and other institutions, there is now an increased focus on the fact that, while
third parties1 significantly profit from buying and selling consumers’ data, the
individuals whose data is being traded do not get paid at all. The upcoming IPO
of Facebook has rekindled the discussion on whether users should benefit from
the data they generate (Bilton, 2012; Streitfeld, 2012).2 And more generally,
there is in principle no reason why third parties should not pay the individuals
for the use of their data (Zax, 2011; Andrews, 2012).
In a number of settings, it is of the utmost importance for the buyer of the
data to obtain an unbiased sample of individuals with certain characteristics;
otherwise the results of his study may not be credible. This is usually the
case for social, educational, and biomedical studies (e.g., Khan et al., 1996).
For instance, a pharmaceutical company might be interested in obtaining an
unbiased sample of a certain demographic that have a certain disease and use a
given drug.
In order to make feasible the payment to individuals for the use of their
data, we design a market that consists of an intermediary (the market-maker)
who facilitates the interactions between those interested in buying access to
unbiased samples of certain data (the buyers) and the individuals to whom the
data correspond (the sellers). Such a market is consistent with today’s reality,
whereby it is easier to obtain information from a third party than from the
individual himself (Gellman, 2009).
Early suggestions for markets for private data did not specify how to set
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appropriate prices (Adar and Huberman, 2001; Laudon, 1996; Sholtz, 2001).
More recently, these markets were studied in the context of differential pri-
vacy (Ghosh and Roth, 2011; Dandekar et al., 2011) under the assumption that
the buyer is only interested in obtaining a statistic that is based on an unbiased
sample, rather than the unbiased sample itself.3
Differential privacy mechanisms are inherently randomized in the sense that
the buyer does not observe the true statistic but a noisy version of it. In this
setting, potential sellers are asked to report their privacy valuations; this is,
however, a major drawback from a practical point of view because it is very
difficult for individuals to know their own valuation (Acquisti et al., 2009)—
especially in that context. We avoid this issue by asking sellers to choose between
different pricing schemes — instead of explicitly stating their privacy valuation.
Another drawback of the differentiable privacy approach is that in order to
achieve a reasonably accurate estimate, the buyer needs to use data from the
majority of individuals in the subset of interest, which renders this mechanism
very expensive for the buyer.4 Our approach avoids this problem by using small
unbiased subsets of the data to compute statistics about them.
In another approach, Riederer et al. (2011) consider a setting where buyers
pay for access to the raw data instead of just an estimate for a statistic. They
correctly argue that this is more realistic because buyers often run specialized
algorithms on the data that they may not be willing to share with the market-
maker. However, Riederer et al. (2011) do not consider the problem of obtaining
unbiased samples, which is the focus of this paper.
We consider the realistic scenario where the data corresponding to each
individual is located in some database (e.g., in a hospital or a Health Information
Exchange) but the buyer does not have the right to access this information. We
will assume that the individuals whose data the buyer is interested in would
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allow him to access this information if appropriately compensated, which elicits
the question: how much should the buyer pay an individual for using his data?
As is well-known, different individuals have different privacy valuations (see,
e.g., Acquisti et al., 2009). For instance, some individuals may not be concerned
about privacy and would allow the buyer to acess their data in exchange for a few
cents, whereas others may only consent if paid at least $10. Since all individuals
prefer to be paid more, even those unconcerned about their privacy may pretend
that they are if they expect that this will result in getting higher payments.
On the other hand, the buyer is interested in obtaining an unbiased sam-
ple without having to pay too much for it. Confronted with this problem, he
may be tempted to buy access to the data with the smallest announced privacy
valuations along the lines of a reverse auction. But this will not give him an
unbiased sample because the value of an attribute is often correlated with its
corresponding privacy valuation (Huberman et al., 2005). The requirement of
an unbiased sample implies the selection of individuals with the same proba-
bility (independently of how much they value privacy), which can significantly
complicate the pricing problem.
In order to solve these problems, we describe the properties that a market
for unbiased samples of private data should have, and suggest a mechanism that
compensates those individuals that participate according to their own privacy
and risk attitudes. Equally important, we show that this mechanism also brings
benefits to buyers of the data as they end up paying for the data less than they
would if they compensated all individuals with the same maximum fee that the
most concerned ones expect. Our approach is based on the fact that a significant
fraction of individuals exhibit risk-averse behavior (Holt and Laury, 2002).
The market-maker first collects information from the sellers with respect to
what pricing schemes they prefer for allowing buyers to access their data. When
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a request from a potential buyer arrives, the market-maker constructs a pricing
menu for authorized, unbiased data sets that, upon purchase, the buyer can use
for whatever legitimate purposes.
2 The Market
The market-maker facilitates the interactions between buyers and sellers accord-
ing to the following sequence:
(A) The market-maker asks each seller a series of questions. For each question,
the seller may select between different pricing schemes that allow a future
buyer to access his data. There is always the choice to opt out. To
minimize bias, the market-maker will offer prices that are high enough so
that only a negligible fraction of sellers opt out.
(B) Every time a potential buyer provides a request specifying what type of
individuals he is interested in:
(1) The market-maker constructs a pricing menu for this request, which
consists of the total price that the buyer has to pay in expectation to
get access to an unbiased sample of K individuals for various values
of K, e.g., it may cost $100 for K = 100 and $250 for K = 200.
(2) The market-maker gives the pricing menu to the buyer, who then
chooses the value ofK that he wants to buy, thus trading off accuracy
and cost: a larger K will provide more accurate results, but at the
same time costs more.
(3) Having selected a value of K, the buyer pays the market-maker the
corresponding price and the market-maker returns an unbiased ran-
dom sample of size K.
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(4) The market-maker uses the buyer’s payment to appropriately com-
pensate the sellers according to what they selected in (A), while keep-
ing a cut for herself.
Observe that multiple buyers may use the data of the same individual. In
that case, the individual is paid each time that a buyer pays for access to the
individual’s data.
It is worth pointing out that to get an accurate estimate of some statistic
(e.g., some average) the buyer does not need to use the entire subset that he
is interested in; a sample of appropriate size will usually suffice. In particular,
let N be the number of individuals who satisfy the requirements of the buyer’s
request and K the size of an unbiased sample. If N is large, it is usually possible
to obtain a good estimate even ifK ≪ N , because of the Law of Large Numbers.
In what follows, the goal of the market-maker is to select the lowest price
at which the buyer can get an unbiased sample. In this way, the market-maker
maximizes the amount of data that is traded. Observe that if the market-maker
set a high price, a seller would be better off if his data was actually sold; however,
a buyer would be less likely to buy. Thus, a high price could lead to market
failure.
In the following sections, we illustrate how our approach works in a setting
with two types of individuals in the population of sellers: one values privacy
a lot, whereas the other does not. We refer to individuals of the former type
as high-cost and to the individuals of the latter type as low-cost. We further
assume that a low-cost individual would sell access to his data if paid any
positive amount. Experimental studies of privacy suggest that this is a good
approximation of reality, as privacy valuations are clustered around two extreme
values, one of which is around zero (Acquisti et al., 2009).5
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3 The Advantages of Risk Aversion
Suppose that the market-maker knows that a high-cost individual would be
willing to sell access to his data if he is paid at least $10, whereas a low-cost
individual would sell access to his data if paid any positive amount. If the
market-maker knew which individuals were low-cost in advance and she had the
ability to price discriminate, she would pay $10 to high-cost individuals and a
very small positive amount to low-cost individuals in exchange for selling access
to their data. But unfortunately for the market-maker and the buyers, she does
not have this information.
One expensive solution is to pay $10 to every individual whose data a buyer
purchases access to. This would certainly make low-cost individuals happy, but
not the buyer. Furthermore, a price of $10 per data point may be too high for
the buyer, resulting in a no-trade outcome. On the other hand, if the price was
strictly smaller than $10, high-cost individuals would not participate and the
resulting estimate would be biased.
The task is to find a means by which the buyer pays strictly less than $10
on average per data point while getting an unbiased estimate. This is possible if
some individuals are risk-averse, that is, they prefer a less risky lottery to a more
risky one with the same expected payment. Experimental studies have shown
that people exhibit risk-averse behavior even for small payoffs, e.g., payments
equal to a couple of dollars (Holt and Laury, 2002).
Suppose that the market-maker asks each individual to select between the
following two options:
• Option A: With probability 0.2, a buyer will get access to your data and
you will receive a payment of $10. Otherwise, you’ll receive no payment.
• Option B: With probability 0.2, a buyer will get access to your data. You’ll
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receive a payment of $1 irrespectively of whether or not a buyer gets access
to your data.
Note that given these two options, no seller is better off opting out. Furthermore,
observe that when an individual selects Option B, he is paid even when his data
is not used.
We expect that most high-cost individuals will choose Option A. In partic-
ular, with Option A, a high-cost individual is fully compensated whenever his
data is used. On the other hand, by chosing Option B, a high-cost individual
incurs a significant loss when his data is used and only receives a small payment.
We expect that this cost will generally outweigh the benefit of getting $1 from
Option B when his data is not used.
The choice of a low-cost individual will depend on his risk attitude:6 he
would select A if he were risk seeking or risk neutral, but would select B if
he were sufficiently risk-averse. Notice that, in expectation, the payment to
someone that selects Option A is higher than the payment to someone that
selects Option B, and that some individuals may select Option B because of
risk aversion.
Now suppose that a buyer is interested in using a sample of individuals with
certain characteristics (e.g., in terms of demographics). Suppose that there are
N = 1000 such individuals and the buyer wants to use a sample of size K = 200.
The market-maker can select a random sample of size K from the population of
N and ask the buyer to pay each individual according to their choices. Note that
each seller is selected with probability K/N = 0.2. If sufficiently many sellers
have selected Option B, then the expected total payment will be significantly
smaller than if everyone was paid according to Option A. For instance, if half of
all individuals choose Option B, the total expected payment is 100 ∗ 10 + 500 ∗
1 = 1, 500, or equivalently $7.5 per data point. On the other hand, if every
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individual is paid $10 when his data is used, the total expected payment would
be 200 ∗ 10 = 2, 000, that is, $10 per data point.
4 Discovering Privacy and Risk Attitudes
More generally, when asking the sellers to select between potential pricing
schemes, the market-maker can vary (1) the probability at which a buyer gets
access to one’s data, (2) the payment from Option A, and (3) the payment from
Option B. Furthermore, the market-maker can give each individual the option
to opt out. That is, an individual would be asked to select between the following
three options:
• Option A: With probability q, a buyer will get access to your data and
you will receive a payment of $x. Otherwise, you’ll receive no payment.
• Option B: With probability q, a buyer will get access to your data. You’ll
receive a payment of $y irrespectively of whether or not a buyer gets access
to your data.
• Option C: No buyer gets access to your data and you receive no payment.
for various values of q, x and y. Note that, with the goal of minimizing the
buyer’s payment, the market-maker is only interested in values for which the
payment to an individual that selects Option B is smaller than the expected
payment to an individual that selects Option A, that is, y < q · x.
Option A provides a high payment if a buyer gets access to one’s data,
but there is no payment otherwise. On the other hand, Option B provides a
lower strictly positive payment — even if one’s data is not used by a buyer.
Each individual will choose each time through several iterations of these three
options with different prices. By aggregating the choices of all individuals, the
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market-maker will then be able to derive pricing menus (as described in the
following section), which she can use to sell the data to buyers.
In order to select appropriate values for x, the market-maker can be informed
by existing studies that assess how much an individual needs to be compensated
to permit a decrease in privacy (Huberman et al., 2005; Acquisti et al., 2009;
Cvrcek et al., 2006). To minimize bias, the market-maker will set x high enough
so that only a negligible fraction of sellers opt out.
Notice that during the first iterations of market making there will be limited
information as to what the ongoing price for the majority of the people is when
selling access to their private data. But as the market matures creating a pricing
menu will require fewer but more accurate (in the sense of the values of x and
y) presentations to the user.
5 The Pricing Menu
Let x¯ be the minimum value of x that is high enough so that only a negligible
fraction of sellers has chosen Option C. In what follows we only consider the
questions with x = x¯.
When a request from a buyer arrives, the market-maker first identifies the
subset of individuals that the buyer is interested in. Suppose that this subset
consists of N individuals. Then, using the choices of these individuals between
Options A and B (for the questions with x = x¯) for each value of the probability
q, the market-maker identifies the minimum expected price for which the buyer
can get access to a random unbiased sample of size q · N . In particular, for a
fixed q: as y increases, the number of sellers that will select Option B increases,
but at the same time the expected payment to each such seller also increases.
For each probability q, the market-maker will choose the value y that minimizes
the expected amount that the buyer has to pay per data point. By doing this for
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every value of q for which she has the choices of sellers, the market-maker derives
the pricing menu. The pricing menu is presented to the buyer as a function of
the sample size, i.e., the number of individuals in the unbiased sample.
Homogeneous Risk Attitudes: An Example
To further quantify the potential gains of our approach, we consider an example
where all sellers exhibit the same level of risk aversion. We assume that the
market-maker knows the distribution of privacy valuations and risk attitudes in
the population of sellers but cannot price discriminate. Note that we only make
this assumption for the sake of example; in reality, the market-maker does not
need to know the privacy and risk attitudes of each seller upfront, but she can
discover this information as discussed in section 4.
Suppose that N = 1000 sellers satisfy the buyer’s specification. Moreover,
assume that the market-maker knows that half of these individuals are high-cost
and need to be compensated at least $10, whereas the other half are low-cost
(i.e., willing to sell access to their data for any positive amount) — but does not
know who is who. We further assume that the risk attitudes of individuals are
described by the standard utility function u(x) = 1−e−x and that when choosing
between a triplet of options (given by the market-maker), each individual will
select the option that maximizes his expected utility (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
If the market-maker has this information, then for every value of the prob-
ability q (resp., the sample size K), she will set x = 10 as the payment for
Option A. Moreover, she will set the payment y of Option B in such a way
that low-cost individuals choose it while minimizing the expected price for the
buyer (the specific value of y will depend on the probability q). We call this the
Optimal Mechanism.7 On the other hand, we refer to the mechanism that pays
any individual $10 when his data is used as the Baseline.
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Figure 1: Expected amount that the buyer pays per data point when sellers’
risk attitudes are given by the standard utility function u(x) = 1− e−x.
Figure 1 shows the expected amount that the buyer pays per data point as
a function of the total number of data points acquired. We observe that, apart
from very large values of K, the Optimal Mechanism is significantly better than
the Baseline Mechanism for the buyer. The expected payment per data point is
equal to $10 for the Baseline Mechanism, whereas for the Optimal Mechanism
it may be as low as $5.5 (for small values of K). Note that if the market-
maker knew the private costs of all individuals and could price discriminate,
the expected payment per data point would be $5. We conclude that by taking
advantage of sellers’ risk aversion, the market-maker can significantly decrease
the prices.
In this example, we have assumed that all sellers are risk-averse. In reality,
some sellers may be risk seeking, and as a result the difference between the
Baseline and the Optimal Mechanism will be smaller. But it is usually still
possible to significantly decrease the price for the buyer if enough low-cost sellers
are risk-averse.
12
6 Bundling Across Requests
In section 4, we discussed how, by asking appropriate questions, the market-
maker can discover what pricing scheme each seller prefers for selling access to
his data to a buyer. More generally, multiple buyers may pay to access the
data of a single seller. The market-maker can facilitate such trade by varying
the wording in Options A and B to reflect that multiple sales may occur. For
instance, the market-maker could ask a seller to select among the following
options:
• Option A: With probability q your data will be selected. If selected,
each time a request comes for your data, the buyer that submitted it
will be allowed to access your data and you will receive a payment of $x.
Otherwise, you’ll receive no payment and no buyer will get access to your
data.
• Option B: With probability q your data will be selected. If selected, each
time a request comes for your data, the buyer that submitted it will be
allowed to access your data. You’ll receive a payment of $y irrespectively
of whether your data is selected.
• Option C: No buyer gets access to your data and you receive no payment.
Note that a risk-averse individual is more likely to select Option B (compared
to Option A) when he expects that a larger number of buyers will be interested
in his data. As a result, the market-maker will be able to further reduce the
expected payment of a single buyer if there is a large number of buyers.
Even though this approach is based on the assumption that multiple buyers
will be interested in the same subset of sellers, it is possible to generalize for
the case that buyers are interested in different subsets which overlap. Then,
the market-maker faces a tradeoff between (1) taking advantage of risk aversion
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as much as possible to minimize each buyer’s expected payment and (2) ask-
ing sellers simple questions (in terms of the pricing schemes they prefer) that
accurately reflect the algorithm that the market-maker uses to assign sellers to
buyers.
Another related issue is whether a seller should have a say on what his data
can be used for. The market-maker can provide information about the range of
applications that buyers may be interested in (e.g., biomedical, educational, and
social studies). Then, by opting in, a seller accepts that his data can be used for
any of these applications by any buyer. Alternatively, there could be multiple
menus that dictate different usage policies; this approach would provide more
transparency but would result in a more complex experience for the sellers.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a realistic and feasible market for unbiased samples of
private data that compensates those individuals that opt to participate accord-
ing to their own privacy and risk attitudes. This is in contrast to other market
approaches to privacy that would result in the acquisition of either cheap and
biased data or unbiased data sets that are large and costly. Our approach can
be used for applications that run the gamut from biomedical to social and ed-
ucational applications. Equally important, we take into account the fact that
in real life a significant fraction of individuals exhibit risk-averse behavior, and
we use this fact to extract a pricing structure that reflects risk attitudes and
benefits the buyer of the data.
The implementation of this market would go a long way to satisfy the growing
chorus of people that complain of not receiving any payment even though their
data is often bought and sold by third parties at a profit.
In spite of the ease of implementation, it might take a while until individuals
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discover and profit from this mechanism. But as the demand for data increases
from the buyer side of the market, we anticipate that the supply will also in-
crease as more people realize that they can make money from selling access to
their data. Notice that in addition to potential costs because of privacy loss,
an individual also has to incur the “cost” of answering a number of questions
comparing different pricing schemes. Nevertheless it might be worthwhile to
respond to these questions if people expect that their choices will be used to
appropriately compensate them for a large number of sales.
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Notes
1Such as Acxiom and Quantcast
2We note that in the case of Facebook and other online services, users do obtain a benefit
in return for their data, because they get free access to these services.
3We note that it is straightforward to extend our approach to settings where each buyer
submits a query to the market-maker and the market-maker returns an estimate based on an
unbiased sample.
4For instance, Ghosh and Roth (2011) consider the problem of getting an unbiased estimate
of the sum of n bits (each of these bits corresponds to a seller). In order to have that
Pr[|estimated sum − true sum| ≥ 0.08n] ≤ 1/3, the buyer needs to pay 95 percent of all
sellers.
5It is straightforward to generalize our results to the case that the privacy valuations of
individuals are drawn from a general distribution as long as the support is bounded.
6The choice of a high-cost individual will also depend on his risk attitudes, but he will
choose Option A for realistic risk attitudes.
7In particular, at the Optimal Mechanism the payment of Option B is the minimum y that
satisfies u(y) ≥ q ·u(10)+(1−q)u(0) (for a fixed q). This is the minimum value of y for which
low-cost sellers choose Option B when x = 10. To see this, recall that a low-cost individual
15
incurs no cost when a buyer gets access to his data. Thus, his utility from choosing Option B
is simply u(y), whereas his expected utility from choosing Option A is q · u(10) + (1− q)u(0)
when x = 10. The individual will select the option that maximizes his expected utility.
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